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LABOR LAW-REMEDIES-An Assessment of the
Proposed "Make-Whole" Remedy in
Refusal-To-Bargain Cases
The conventional National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) remedy against an employer who has violated section 8(a)(5) 1 of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by refusing to bargain with
a properly certified union is a cease-and-desist order coupled with a
directive ordering the employer to bargain with the union at the
union's request. However, the interval between an employer's initial
refusal to bargain and the final entry of a court of appeals' decree
enforcing the NLRB's order to bargain has often been of such long
duration2 that unions have complained that the conventional remedy is relatively meaningless and ineffective. The unions' first argument is that the NLRB order is inadequate because it does not
compensate employees for the "loss" of the economic benefits which
they might have received from the employer if collective bargaining
had taken place. The unions also argue that since the normal ceaseand-desist remedy does not require the employer to make good these
"losses," many employers are actually encouraged to violate section
8(a)(5) in order to gain time during which they do not have to confer
any benefits. In short, the argument is that an employer has much
to gain by deliberately violating the NLRA, since all he presently
risks by such conduct is a mild reprimand in the form of a ceaseand-desist order.3 In four recent NLRB cases, including the celebrated Ex-Cell-O case, 4 several unions have argued that a provision for restoring the "lost benefits" of collective bargaining to
employees-that is, a "make-whole" order-should be included in
the remedy for an employer's unlawful refusal to bargain. 11
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). Section 8(a)(5) provides that it will be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of fhis title."
2. The AFL-CIO has stated that the average time for this process is 30.3 months.
Brief for the Charging Party at 9-10, app. A, Ex-Cell-O Corp., Case No. 25-CA-2377
(trial examiner's decision rendered March 7, 1967). Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 161 NLRB
939 (1966), provides an illustrative example of the problem: "On January 13, 1965, the
Court of Appeals ••• issued its decision ••• including its order to bargain. On January 13, 1965, the Respondent advised the Union that it was now willing to recognize
the Union pursuant to its certification of August 31, 1962 ••••" 161 NLRB at 940.
3. An order directing an employer to cease and desist from refusing to bargain
after the employer has successfully postponed collective bargaining for several years assertedly constitutes nothing more than a "slap on the wrist." Brief for the Charging
Party, supra note 2, at 5. For an effective presentation of the union arguments .see
Schlossberg &: Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-to-Bargain
Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1059 (1968). The authors are counsel for the union (charging
party) in Ex-Cell-O Corp., Case No. 25-CA-2377 (trial examiner's decision rendered
March 7, 1967).
4. Case No. 25-CA-2377 (trial examiner's decision rendered March 7, 1967).
Lumber Co., Case No. 26-CA-2536 (trial examiner's decision rendered Jan. 4, 1967);
5. On July 13, 1967 the NLRB heard oral argument on four cases in which- the pro·
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The unions' proposed strengthening of the remedy gTanted for
employer violations of section 8(a)(5) poses both practical and theoretical problems. For instance, while it would be difficult for the
union to show to what extent its members were actually injured by
the employer's violation, its failure to prove actual injury arguably
renders its request for lost benefits so speculative that it would
posed rtmcdy was requested, but has yet to render a decision. The cases are Ex-Cell-O
Corp., Case No. 25-CA-2377 (trial examiner's decision rendered March 7, 1967); Herman
Wilson Lumber Co., Case No. 26 CA-2536 (trial examiner's decision rendered Jan, 4, 1967);
Zinke's Foods, Inc., Case No. 30-CA-372 (trial examiner's decision rendered Dec. 18,
1966); Rasco Olympia, Inc., Case :-:o. 19-CA-3187 (trial examiner's decision rendered
Dec. 9, 1966). In Ex-Cell-O, the union had won a representation election in October
1964, and was certified by the ::-.LRB's Regional Director. The employer's request for
review was filed and granted, but its objections to the validity of the election were
overruled and the NLRB affirmed certification of the union in October 1965. Ex-Cello notified the union that it would refuse to bargain in order to obtain judicial review
of the NLRB's certification decision. a so-called "technical" 8(a)(5) violation. Brief for
the Respondent at 4-5. See text accompanying notes 32 &: 33 infra. No other unfair labor practice has been charged. It is to be noted that over four years have passed since
the union won the representation election, and it has been more than three years since
the NLRB's decision to affirm certification; Ex-Cell-O's employees are still without representation at the bargaining table. If the customary order is given to remedy the
8(a){5) violation, it will merely direct Ex-Cell-O to begin bargaining.
The other three cases are distinguishable in some respects. In Herman Wilson
Lumber Co., conduct by the employer in ,·iolation of section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1964), as well as in violation of section 8(a)(5) is charged. In Zinke's
Foods, the employer's lack of a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status (established by authorization cards) as evidenced by "flagrant" violations of section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 8(a)(3) (1964), and section 8(a)(l), produced the unlawful
refusal to bargain charge. See TXD-662-66, at 15 (Dec. 18, 1966) (trial examiner's
decision).
The fourth case, Rasco Olympia, is not a first contract bargaining situation. -:t:he
unfair labor practice charge arose when, upon expiration of the old contract, respon•
dent refused to bargain ove1 terms of a new contract. The issue of a compensatory
remedy in these circumstances was eliminated by the unions in order to focus attention on the three cases involving newly certified unions. During oral argument it was
stated:
Counsel for the union think [that a successor contract case] is not the kind of case
in which the great need for the compensatory remedy is present as it is in the first
contract case.
•·
We would hope that if you decide to fashion a compensatory remedy for the
first contract cases that you will, in due course ._ •• find it suitable and appropri•
ate to apply compensatory remedies to cases like Rasco •••• (T]he Board might
properly consider the application of the compensatory remedy on a first contract
basis and defer until future experience ••• the necessity ••• c,f applying it to
successor contract situations.
Official Report of Proceedings Before the NLRB, Docket No. 25-CA-2377 et al., oral
argument, July 13, 1967, at 256-58.
The NLRB is faced with divergent views among its trial examiners as to whether
compensation awards are justified. The remedy was rejected by the trial examiners in
Herman Wilson Lumber Co., Case :-:o. 26-CA-2356 (trial examiner's decision rendered
Jan. 4, 1967); General Automation Mfg., Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 66 (1968); Triangle
Plastics, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1967); Monroe Auto Equip. Co., 164 N.L.R.B. No.
144 (1967); United Ins. Co., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1967); Saks &: Co., 160 N.L.R.B. No.
682 (1966); Preston Prods. Co., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 322 (1966), enforced sub nom. UAW
v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1967). However, the remedy was accepted by
trial examiners in Indianapolis Glove Co., Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1968); Ex-Cell-O
Corp., Case No. 25-CA-2377 (trial examiner's decision rendered March 7, 1967); Zinke's
Food~. Inc., Case No. 30-CA-372 (trial examiner's decision rendered Dec. 18, 1966).
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amount to a plea for a "punitive" remedy-a type of relief which
the NLRB is not authorized .to give. Employers also contend that
the unions' proposed remedy is not comparable to a back pay award,
but that it is designed merely to compensate generally for the lost
opportunity to bargain. According to the employers, when viewed
in this light, the make-whole remedy amounts to nothing more than
having the NLRB award general damages-again, something which
it is not generally empowered to do. It is also possible to argue that
the make-whole remedy infringes the employer's "right" to violate
"technically" section 8(a)(5); such a violation is the only way an
employer may obtain judicial review of NLRB certification deci•
sions. Finally, assuming that these problems may be resolved in favor
of the make-whole remedy, consideration must also be given to the
possibility that the imposition of this remedy contravenes the policy
expressed in section 8(d) of the NLRA. Section 8(d) states that the
Act "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession," 6 and it may be argued that the makewhole remedy is equivalent to having the NLRB dictate the substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 7
The question of whether the NLRB has the authority to make
such an order in the first instance is of primary importance in
· establishing the availability of the make-whole remedy. Section lO(c)
of the NLRA allows the NLRB to order such "affirmative action
... as will effectuate the policies of the [Act]."8 Although a literal
reading of this section would seem to provide adequate authority,11
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
7. For an effective presentation of employer arguments, see McGuiness, Is the
Award of Damages for Refusals To Bargain Consistent with National Labor Policy1,
14 WAYNE L. REv. 1086 (1968). Mr. McGuiness is counsel for the employer (respondent)
in Ex-Cell-O Corp., Case No. 25-CA-2377 (trial examiner's decision rendered March 7,
1967).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964), which reads in pertinent part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any·person named in the ~omplaint has engaged in ••• any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall ..• take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this subchapter.
9. In Phtlps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941), the Supreme Court
discussed the ::-:LRB's remedial powers:
[C]ongress could not catalogue all the devices and stratagems for circumventing
the policies of the Act. i'>or could it define the whole gamut of remedies to effec•
tuate these policies in an infinite variety of situations. Congress met these difficulties by leaving the adaptation of means to end to the empiric process of
administration. The exercise of the process was committed to the Board, subject
to limited judicial review. Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly
a matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area
of the Board's discretion ....
And in Virginia Elec. &: Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943), the Court, in
affirming a lower court's enforcement of an NLRB order reimbursing employees for
dues deducted from wages to support an illegal company union, stated: "'We give considerable weight to that administrative determination. It should stand unless it can be
shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which
can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act."
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the Supreme Court has held that section lO(c) does not authorize
the NLRB to issue "punitive" orders, even if such orders are intended to deter violations of the NLRA.10 Since NLRB orders must
be strictly remedial, it follows that orders directing an employer to
make money payments must be compensatory; such orders cannot
constitute a penalty or a fine. 11 Thus, it seems that any order requiring that an employer pay money to "make" employees "whole"
must be based upon losses that can actually be proved to have resulted from the employer's unlawful refusal to bargain.12 If the
union seeks damages under section lO(c) by showing compensable
loss, its first step must be to show that its members suffered a loss
when bargaining was unlawfully delayed.
The success of a claim that union members suffer a loss when
an employer refuses to bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5) depends upon the union's ability to establish three propositions~ (1)
that collective bargaining would in fact have resulted in an agreement had the employer bargained originally; (2) that such an agreement would have provided the employees with benefits greater than
those which they actually received during the period of the employer's refusal to bargain with the union; and (3) that these lost
benefits can be measured in some reasonably accurate manner.
To support the contention that a contract wo-uld have been
reached had the employer bargained initially, the unions stress that
a recent study indicates that 86 per cent of newly certified unions
successfully negotiate contracts in those cases where employers bargain voluntarily.13 Moreover, the study concludes that a contract is
IO. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938), where
the Court stated:
[A]uthority to order affirmative action does not go so far as to confer a punitive
jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon the employer any penalty it may
choose because he is engaged in unfair labor practices. even though the Board be
of the opinion that the pelicies of the Act might be effectuated by such on order.
11. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10, 11 (1940).
12. In Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961), an
=-:LRB order requiring the refunding of dues and other assessments to members when
their union acted in violation of section 8(b)(l)(A) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(l)(A) (1964), and section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964), was
overturned because
Where no membership in the union was shown to be influenced or compelled by
reason of any unfair labor practice, no "consequences of violation" are removed
by the order compelling the union to return all dues and fees collected from the
members; and no "dissipation" of the effects of the prohibited action is
achieved • • . • The order in those circumstances becomes punitive and beyond
the power of the Board.
Cf. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 544 (1943), where union dues
were refunded to workers: "[fhe Board's order] returns to the employees what has
been taken from them to support an organization not of their free choice . • • •
[fhe] assumption that employees receive no benefit ... is possible .... [W]e hold that
the Board made an allowable judgement." See also Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
702, 70! (1943); NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 600 (1941); International Assn.
of Machinists v. NLRB, 3ll U.S. 72, 82 (1940).
13. See Ross, Analysis of Administrative Process Under Taft-Hartley, 1966 I.AB. REL.
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reached in only 36 per cent of the cases in which recalcitrant employers are compelled to bargain under court order. 14 The unions
claim that these statistics demonstrate that the lack of success in
dealing with an employer who is under court order to bargain is
attributable to the deleterious effects on union bargaining strength
occasioned by the employer-induced delay in recognizing the jlnion.
In other words, the union contention is that a delay in beginning
collective bargaining serves to dissipate union strength because employees gain no additional benefits during the delay period.111 The
ultimate effect of this delay-according to the unions-is probably
to .prevent an agreement that would have been the likely result had
bargaining taken place originally. This argument assumes, however,
that the failure to agree while bargaining under a court order is
due solely to the dissipation of union strength-a conclusion which
does not necessarily follow. For example, it is certainly possible that
if the union in fact had significant strength or status at the time of
the employer's refusal to bargain, such strength would have manifested itself in an unfair labor practice strike designed to force the
recalcitrant employer to the bargaining table. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to conclude that a union which is too weak to negotiate
a contract with an employer who is under court order to bargain
was probably also weak at the time of its certification.16 Indeed, the
YEARBOOK 299, 306 (1967). This study is b:ised on im examination of 1,008 cases closed
by the NLRB between 1957 and 1962 in which there was a finding or an inference of
a violation of the duty to bargain imposed by section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. Id. at 299.
See Schlossberg &: Silard, supra note 3, app. ix, at 1082-85.
14. Ross, supra note 11, at 302.
15. "The Employer may well escape with no contract at all because the initial
organizing strength has meanwhile been so eroded that he can outlast a strike and
break union representation entirely." Brief for the Charging Party, supra note 2, at 19.
16. Illustrative of the problem weak unions face in obtaining recognition was the
strike called when the Herman Wilson Lumber Company first refused to bargain with
the woodworkers' union after NLRB certification.
We struck for 2 weeks . . . and everybody went back . . . because they were
intimidated, and for other reasons..._.
It was a totally ineffectual manner for enforcing the certification and obligation
to bargain.
Oral argument by Mr. James Youngdahl for International Woodworkers of America,
Official Report of Proceedings, supra note 5, at 187.
Although the bargaining status of the union when negotiations finally begin may
have been weakened by loss of loyalty among the membership, it is possible that a
delay wo.uld not have had a fundamental effect upon the economic power it com•
manded-and it is the latter that will ultimately determine whether a contract agreement will be reached. For example, arguably it is harder to get workers to strike over
recognition than over specific economic issues, where the purpose of the strike is
easily discernible to the employees. It would follow that loss of loyalty after a two- to
four-year period without bargaining might not seriously affect a union's power to call
an economic strike over a concrete dispute about proposed contract terms once
bargaining began, and thus that its economic power was not diminished. This might
not be the case, however, if the employer unilaterally granted some benefits to the
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statistics relied upon by unions to show that union bargaining status
declines during this refusal period may in fact demonstrate that an
employer who refuses to bargain with a certified union in the first
instance is likely to be a hard bargainer who is unwilling to deal
with unions.17 By this analysis, it is doubtful "'7_hether the union
would ever have negotiated a more beneficial agreement with the
employer even if the latter had bargained in compliance with the
NLRA. 18
employees during the period of the refusal to bargain, and thus further undercut loyalty
to the union.
On the other hand, when an employer first violates section 8(a)(5) following union
certification, an unfair labor practice strike would seem easier to call, not only because of greater loyalty to the union at that time but also be cause-unlike
the case of an economic strike growing out of negotiations following immediate
recognition (without an 8(a)(5) violation)-the workers would not be striking
under the threat of permanent replacement. Compare NLRB v. MacKay Radio
&: Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (employer may hire permanent replacements for those
employees participating in an t:~onomic strike) with Collins &: Aikman Corp., 165
N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1967) (employer is not free to hire permanent replacements for
those employees participating in a strike called because of the employer's unfair
labor practice). Thus, although it may be harder to get members to strike over nonrecognition that constitutes an unfair labor practice than over economic issues, the
problem would seem to be counterbalanced by the additional safeguards provided to
workers who are engaged in an unfair labor practice strike. In short, it seems doubtful
that mere delay in bargaining lessens the opportunity that a contract agreement will
be reached because the union has thereby been weakened. Loyalty to the Union following immediate recognition which could have been drawn upon as a strike threat
in order to obtain concessions at the bargaining table would seemingly have been used
to force recognition through an unfair labor practice strike in those cases where the
emplo}er refused to bargain at all. If such loyalty was not sufficient to force recognition, it is indeed questionable that it ever could have forced bargaining concessions.
Therefore, it is arguable that a union which cannot force an employer to bargain at
the outset really has not lost anything in the intervening refusal period-it never
had the requisite strength with which to command anything in the first instance.
17. See Ross, supra note 13, at 307, where the suggestion is made that employers
engaging in conduct violative of section 8(a)(5) characteristically are unwilling to deal
with unions:
[I]t is not time alone _-i-.:hich accounts for the differences in bargaining results
••• it is the nature of the employer determination to resist his bargaining obligations, as expressed in his unlawful behavior •••• It appears far more reasonable
and consistent with the evidence to assume that employers violate Section 8(a)(5)
because they don't like unions and prefer not to engage in any kind of collective
bargaining.
In oral argument before the NLRB, the fundamental antiunion attitude of section
8(a)(5) violators was impliedly admitted by counsel for the AFL-CIO when discussing
whether the proposed remedy should be given only in cases of "bad faith" refusals to
bargain and not in situations where the unfair labor practice was committed in order
to obtain judicial review of an i;l;LRB certification decision (see text accompanying
notes !13 and 34 infra):
If the Board awards damages to only non-technical violation cases, it would be
damages to particularly hard bargaining situations where the employer is violently
anti-union . . . where there is least probability of loss . . . . [Furthermore] the
"technical [violation]" is part of a standard anti-union arsenal of employers and
[in] the South, in particular, part of a standard thing that they do to defeat and
to also delay the union representation.
Official Report of Proceedings, supra note 5, at 181-82.
18. An employer may be required to bargain under the NLRA, but he is not
required to reach agreement. NLRB v. American Natl. Ins. Co., 34!1 U.S. !195, 402
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It may be possible for the union attempting to demonstrate that
its members have suffered compensable loss to sidestep proving the
probability that a collective bargaining agreement would have been
-r-eached by arguing that in fact such proof should not be a prerequisite to awarding the make-whole remedy. Support for this contention may be found by way of analogy to the Supreme Court's
decision in Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. NLRB. 19 In
that case the employer's failure to negotiate with the union before
he unilaterally contracted certain maintenance work out of the bargaining unit was held to be a violation of section 8(a)(5). Since all
mai.ntenance workers had been discharged as of the expiration date
of the existing maintenance contract, the NLRB ordered the employer to bargain with the union over the contracting-out decision
The NLRB also directed the employer to reinstate the discharged
employees ·with back pay for the period of the layoff; the back pa'}
award was based upon the terms of the expired contract. The Su•
preme Court upheld this remedy, stating: "There has been no showing that the Board's order restoring the status quo ante to insun
meaningful bargaining is not well designed to promote the polick
of the Act." 20
Since the decision to contract out the maintenance work coulc1
have been made even if the matter had been discussed with the
union, 21 it could be contended that there was no basis upon which
to award compensatory damages to the discharged employees because
there was no showing of actual loss.22 However, such an argument
would seem to have been at least implicitly rejected by the Court's
decision. 23 The Fibreboard opinion did not address the question of
(1952). Good faith bargaining may lead not to a contract but to an impasse. See text
accompanying notes 40 and 41 infra.
19. 379 U.S. 203 (l964).
20. 379 U.S. at 216.
21. Fibreboard claimed that substantial savings would be effected by contracting
out maintenance work. Ben Wilson, Director of Purchases for Fibreboard, testified,
"we felt that economies up to one-third of that total were entirely possible • • . •
[T]he cost of maintenance and power house work was ¼ million dollars per year."
Record at 131, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The
NLRB agreed that the company's motive in subcontracting was economic rather than
antiunion; but nevertheless the NLRB remedied the section 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain
violation by basing the back pay on the terms of the expired contract.
22. This issue was not argued in Fibreboard.
23. There would be little motivation for an employer to refrain from violating
section 8(a)(5) where a decision to subcontract is to be made if he could claim that
any back pay remedy is inappropriate because his final decision would not have been
different even if he had behaved legally and bargained with the union. One would
surely not expect such conduct to be deterred merely by an order to bargain after the
decision to subcontract has been made and implemented. In order to give section
8(a)(5) any meaning at all in these situations, effective remedies for violations must be
devised. Thus back pay has been awarded in a number of cases where workers have
been released following a unilateral management decision to subcontract work out
of the bargaining unit, even though the result might well h3\'e been the ~me if
0
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whether the employer would have made the same decision if he had
bargained; rath(!r, the Court relied on the illegality under section
8(a)(5) of the employer's decision in upholding the back pay remedy.
Thus, by analogy to Fibreboard, the make-whole remedy requested in
Ex-Cell-O and its companion cases could be approved without proof
of whether a contract would in fact have resulted if bargaining _had
taken place. The unions can argue that the employer's illegal conduct should preclude any consideration of such a question.
Of course, the NLRB may agree with the unions' present argument-resting on the statistics mentioned earlier-that it is likely
that a collective bargaining agreement would have been reached;
alternatively, it could adopt the argument advanced in this Note
that the union does not have to prove that it was probable that an
agreement would have been concluded if bargaining had occurred.
In either case, two troublesome and interrelated problems of proof
still remain: whether the employees have irretrievably lost certain
benefits because an agreement was not concluded; and whether there
is an accurate way to calculate the amount of any such losses.
Employers have generally contended that these two problems clearly
reveal that the make-whole remedy is essentially penal.24 It is pointed
out that collective bargaining contracts frequently do not produce
increased employee benefits and thus that actual loss does not necessarily occur simply because of the absence of a contract.25 Furtherbargaining over the subcontracting decision had occurred. See, e.g., NLRB v. WinnDixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966); NLRB v.
American Mfg. Co., 361 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965). In NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., the
court awarded back pay while recognizing that bargaining may not in any way change
the employer's final decision about subcontracting: "[T]he Act . . . is still based on
,oluntary bargaining. To require bargaining is not to require a bargain..•. When it
bargains, it must do so in good faith. But on this major issue, it may bargain to the
bitter end of a real impasse." 351 F.2d at 80. Nonetheless it found the back pay order
"reasonably needed to effectuate the policies of the Act." 351 F.2d at 81.
And in the successor-emplo.yer situation, where the purchaser of a concern refuses
to bargain with the employees in the newly acquired plant and no significant change
in the work to be performed is contemplated, the possibility that a less favorable contract would emerge from bargaining sessions between the union and the new employer
has not barred NLRB imposition of a back pay award based upon the old contract.
This is true even though by the terms of purchase no contractual obligations of the
p.-eccding owner were assumed:
As it is speculative, and cannot be determined, what rate or rates of 8,ay might
have governed their employment had the Respondent fulfilled its ob.igation to
bargain with their representative, and as in any event their existing rate could
not have been changed until and unless the Respondent had fulfilled its bargaining obligation, we shall direct that backpay due them shall be computed at the
rate provided in the contract governing their employee relationship at the time
Respondent acquired the enterprise.
Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1082 (1965).
'Z4. See McGuiness, supra note 7, at 1088-91.
25. Indeed, as McGuiness points out, bargaining may lead to an impasse,
"[fJollowed by a legitimate strike, lockout or permanent plant closure." Id. at 1089. In
such situations, although good faith bargaining has occurred, a complete
of earnings results.

loss
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more, the employers contend that if any losses do exist, they are
-purely speculative. However, it is submitted that the issues of loss
and loss measurement should not be dismissed on abstract theoretical grounds before the particular union in a given case has been
afforded an opportunity to prove that it has in fact suffered a loss.
In order to show that employees have lost some benefits as a
result of an employer's violation of section 8(a)(5), a union might
rely upon reasonable inferences drawn from an analysis of the many
factors which affect the collective bargaining process. For instance,
the relative increase in plant productivity and profits during the
refusal-to-bargain period might be shown to be grnssly disproportionate to any actual increase in employee wage levels or benefits.
A union might also point to its successful demands for increased
employee benefits at similar businesses in the same locale,2 6 or to
the success of its bargaining with the same employer in different
areas or at -other plants.21 On the other hand, the employer should
be permitted to show that such factors do not reveal a consistently
successful pattern of union bargaining. For instance, an employer
might be able to demonstrate that certain conditions render an
apparent pattern of union-instigated wage increments inapplicable
to the particular case in question. The NLRB, balancing these considerations, could conclude that the union has established ·with reasonable probability that an employer's refusal to bargain caused a
loss to the employees. In those ~ases in which such a probability is
determined to exist, the union's case for the make-whole remedy
should be considered established; of course, the problem of assigning
a dollar value to the loss for which employees are to be made whole
remains.
It is at this point that the employers contend that any method of
measuring such loss would be so speculative as to amount to a pen26. The union in Herman Wilson Lumber Co. suggested the average increases they
negotiated with Arkansas-located employers engaged in the manufacture and sale of
lumber and related products as a yardstick. TXD-7.57-66, at 6 Gan. 4, 1967). A similar proposal using median wages paid by footl markets of comparable size in the Beloit.
Wisconsin, area under contract with Retail Clerks Union Local ~o. 1401 was made in
Zinke's Foods, Inc.. TXD-662-66, at 20-21 (Dec. 18, 1966). In Ex-Cell-O Corp., tI11:
UAW offered the comparison of direct and indirect increases received by employee~
in Ex-Cell-O's Elwood plant-where the controversy arose-with the average increases
nt>gotiated by the UAW and other Indiana employers engaged in the manufacture of
precision parts and machinery. Brief for the Charging Party, supra note 2, at 15.
27. In Ex-Cell-O, evidence was offered of the contract benefits the union had obtained from the Respondent at three plants in Ohio and fiYe in Michigan. There is a
"certain degree of uniformity among the contract provisions covering the employees
of all these plants," the trial examiner reported, and significant differences did exi~t
between these provisions and the terms and conditions of employment of the Elwood
employees. Supplemental unemployment benefits, contractually guaranteed cost-ofliving adjustments, and medical and insurance provisions either were more limited in
scope or were not provided at all to the workers in the unorganized plant. TXD-8067, at I!!-14 (March 7, 1967).
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alty. The speculative aspects could be said to result from the union's
inability to reduce the theoretical factors of loss to specific dollar
amounts. For example, employers may object to union reliance upon
statistical data such as average wage increments gained from collective bargaining throughout the nation in the same industry; 28 the
use of average data does not necessarily provide a reliable standard
of loss in any given case. The "average wage increment" may have
been skewed by very large gains in one settlement, although small
gains, no gains, or even losses predominate in the remaining cases.
Moreover, use of the "average bargaining settlement" as a gauge of
employee loss in a particular case will necessarily fail to take into
account the myriad variables which affect the process of collective
bargaining. Such factors include the economic situation at a particular plant, the degree of collective bargaining maturity exhibited
in the past by the parties to the dispute, the parties' relative economic strength, the nature of proposals and counterproposals,29 and
the individual personalities of the bargaining parties. On the other
hand, it seems that if these factors are considered along with "average settlement" data, the results, although not exact, would be more
than purely speculative. The lack of an exact measure for determination of the employees' loss should not lead to the conclusion that
any attempt to approximate damages renders the make-whole proposal a penalty. ·what is really at stake is the possibility of overestimating that loss which has occurred because of the employer's unlawful refusal to bargain as opposed to allowing no compensatory
remedy at all for that violation. In this situ~tion, the equities clearly
lie ·with granting a remedy. Defining the exact loss must be a subsidiary goal. Once the existence of a loss is established satisfactorily,
the sound principle is to attempt to determine its -extent as accurately as possible.80 Again, exact measurement is not the test; it is
28. '\V'age increment data is summarized annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). In Herman Wilson Lumber Co., Case No. 26-CA-2536 (trial examiner's decision rendered Jan. 4, 1967), it was proposed that the BLS average figures of negotiated
increases with companies in the geographical area, involved in the particular industry,
or engaged in the manufacture and sale of lumber and related products generally,
could be compared with Herman Wilson's employees' economic gains during the period
of the section 8(a)(5) violation. See TXD-757-66, at 6 Gan. 4, 1967) (trial examiner's
decision). The difference in these amounts was used to measure the benefits employees
lost because of the unlawful refusal to bargain. For similar proposals in other cases,
see notes 22 &: 23 supra.
29. For example, the union might be willing to forgo increased wages for its mem•
hers in exchange for a union security agreement.
30. When certainty in the fact of damage is established in cases involving employer unfair labor practices in discriminatorily discharging employees, the major issue
becomes finding a reasonable method to determine loss. See F. W. Woolworth Co. v.
NLRB, 121 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1941). By analogy, certainly in the fact of damage in the
instant situation may result from the "lost opportunity to bargain" because of the
employer's unlawful refusal to bargain, assuming that loss has been established as
suggested in this Note. Thereafter the concern is, of course, to determine the probable
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reasonably accurate measurement.81
monetary loss incurred by the employees. It has been suggested that the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' data on wage increments gained in collective bargaining nationally
should be prima facie evidence of the amount of the loss, rebuttable whenever the
employer or union could show by relevant data that other figures-higher or lowerare more appropriate. An example of other relevant data might be the gains achieved
by the same union in collective bargaining with the same company at other locations.
See notes 26 & 27 supra.
It has also been suggested that a supplemental hearing could be held by the NLRB
to determine the employee loss on the basis of statistical data and other evidence
submitted by the complainant union and the respondent employer.
31. See, e.g., F. W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1941) where an
estimate of back pay due was based upon the assumption that the ratio of union men
to nonunion men among the employees discharged in a nondiscriminatory layoff would
have been the same as in the plant as a whole. For the number of union men actually
laid off which exceeded the number of union men "reasonably to be expected to be
laid off," back pay accumulated. The NLRB order directed that this back pay was to
be distributed among all the discriminatorily discharged workers. "[T]he Borad was
forced to use hypothesis and assumption instead of proved fact. But its order is not
invalid on that account • • . . 'Certainty as to the amount goes no further than to
require a basis for a reasoned conclusion.'" 121 F.2d at 663.
In NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1963), a proceeding in
which respondent, Brown and Root, Inc., disputed the NLRB's method for calculating
back pay, the Court enforced the NLRB's order, stating:
We have held that with respect to the formula for arriving at back.pay rates or
amounts which the Board may deem necessary to devise in a particular situation,
"our inquiry may ordinarily go no further than to be satisfied that the method
selected cannot be declared to be arbitrary or unreasonable in the circumstances
involved."
311 F.2d at 452. See also-Jack G. Buncher, 164 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (1967), where the
extent of respondent's back pay liability was determined by assuming that a seniority
,ystem would have been utilized by the employer to select employees for retention,
layoff, and recall, even though respondent did not, in fact, use such a system: "[T]he
Board occasionally is required to adopt formulas which result in back.pay determinations that are close approximations because no better basis exists for determining
the exact amounts due." 164 N.L.R.B. No. 31 at 3.
-Yo return once again to the Fibreboard decision, it seems clear that the make-whole
·,emedy argued in that case represented only a reasonable approximation of employee
J,:;ss. The NLRB back pay remedy .:was based upon the terms of an expired contract,
although there was little reason to believe that a similar result would have been
reached had the employer bargained. In fact, the likelihood was that employees
either would have suffered a sharp decrease in wages or would have been permanently
discharged, regardless of union opportunity to negotiate the matter. The Board found
that the company's decision to subcontract was based on an economic-not antiunionmotive. See note 21 supra. Since substantial savings could be effected by subcontracting
out maintenance work, it was most uniikely that the discharged maintenance employees
would have ended up with terms equal to the expired contract if the company had
decided to bargain over a new contract.
By way of analogy then, the speculation involved in the refusal-to-bargain situation
seems no greater than that speculation which has already been sanctioned by the
Supreme Court in Fibreboard.
The effect of wage increases in violation of section 8(a)(5) during the period of the
unlawful refusal to bargain must also be considered. This problem was recently dealt
with in Indianapolis Glove, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1968). The trial examiner
determined that wage increases unilaterally passed on to employees during the period
of the employer's unlawful refusal to bargain equalled or surpassed the gains they
would have received through collective bargaining, measured by average wage incre•
ments for the period. The trial examiner's recommended order proposed that the
employer be required to pay employees a sum equal to the value of the wage increases which would have been gained through collective bargaining to dissipate the

December 1968]

Notes

385

Assuming that the make-whole remedy is to be accepted on the
grounds advanced above, several other plausible objections and
qualifications to it must be considered. There is a question whether
the make-whole remedy should be applicable to all violations of
section 8(a)(5). Employer refusal-to-bargain cases may be conceptually classified depending upon the intent of the employer. The first
type-the "bad faith" violation-may be said to involve the kind of
conduct which section 8(a)(5) is specifically intended to correct: the
refusal of an employer to negotiate with a majority union which he
knows is an appropriate representative of his employees. The second
type of violation-the so-called "good faith" or "technical" refusal
to bargain32-involves an employer who has deliberately violated
section 8(a)(5) in order to obtain judicial review of the appropriateness of the NLRB's decision to certify the union.33 Despite the fact
that employees may suffer lost benefits regardless of whether the
employer's refusal to bargain was in "bad faith" or of the "technical"
variety,3 t it is at least arguable that imposition of the make-whole
effects of the unfair labor practice; this order was not accepted by the NLRB. Under a
theory of compensation, the employees had suffered no loss and the recommended
order was clearly punitive. The case suggests that the proposed remedy, to remain
strictly compensatory, would require deduction of any unilateral wage increases that
have been granted to employees from the amount to be paid over to employees as
compensation for losses suffered during the refusal-to-bargain period. If unions are
granted the requested remedy, resolution of this problem will be necessary.
32. Ex-Cell-O admitted the underying facts constituting a section 8(a)(5) violation,
justifying its action as a "technical" refusal to bargain done in order to obtain judicial
review of the NLRB's certification of the union, see note 5 supra.
33. See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476-79 (1964). The Court stated at
· 76-77:
[T]hc final order[s] made reviewable by Sections IO(e) and (f) in the Courts of
Appeals do not include Board decisions in certification proceedings. Such decisions,
rather, are normally reviewable only where the dispute concerning the correctness
of the certification eventuates in a finding by the Board that an unfair labor practice has been committed as, for example, where an employer refuses to bargain
with a certified representative on the ground that the election was held in an inappropriate bargaining unit. In such a case, Section 9(d) of the Act makes full provision for judicial review of the underlying certification order •..•
Section 9(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1964), reads in pertinent part:
Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to Section 160(c)[I0(c)) of this
title is based in whole or in part upon facts certified following an investigation
pursuant to subsection (c) of the section and there is a petition for the enforcement or review of such order, such certification and the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be :filed
under subsection (e) or (f) of section 160 of this title, and thereupon the decree of
the court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of
the Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript.
34. Good faith based upon an erroneous view of the law has never been a defense
10 a refusal-to-bargain charge. Thus, in IUE, Local 613, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 328 F.2d
7::!3 (3d Cir. 1964), an order of reinstatement with back pay was enforced even though
workers were discharged under an agreement made by their union and the company
which accorded superseniority rights to replacements hired during the course of an
c,;onomic strike. It was argued that the N'LRB's order would be inequitable because
the company had acted in good faith, honestly believing that they had a right to
adopt the job assurance plan agreed upon to protect replacements. 328 F.2d at 727.
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remedy in the latter situation unduly prejudices an employer's right
to obtain judicial review of NLRB certification rulings. 31s
However, an analysis of the purposes underlying the statutory
provisions for judicial review of representation proceedings seems
to indicate that there should not be any distinction drawn between
"good faith" and "bad faith" violations of section 8(a)(5) with respect to the ·application of the make-whole remedy. In fact, automatic application of the remedy without regard to the suggested
distinction would seem to further the purposes of the NLRA. Direct
review of NLRB resolution of representation questions under section 9 of the NLRA was deliberately excluded from the statute
because Congress determined that questions of representation should
be decided expeditiously in order to accelerate the initiation of col1.ective bargaining by the parties.36 The employer could secure judidal review only by refusing to bargain and then asserting his objeccions to i:.he section 9 proceedings as an affirmative defense to the
ensuing unfair labor practice charge. Congress declined to change
this method of review in 1947.37 In an attempt to prevent frivolous
claims, the employer can secure review of section 9 proceedings only
by risking a determination that he has committed an unfair labor
However, the court rejected this argument stating:
·we are of the view that good faith, based upon an erroneous interpretation of the
law, is not available as a defense. • . . An employer who pursues a course of
conduct later determined to be unfair labor practice does so at his peril .••• The
equities in this case seem to favor the employees; it would be inequitable to require
them to absorb pay losses ascribable to the unfair labor practice of the Company.
388 F.2d at 727. See also Old King Cole, Inc. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 1958);
Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1956). In Fibre•
board there was no willful violation of section 8(a)(5) since the employer's decision
to terminate the employees' jobs was based upon a mistaken belief that the decision
to contract out maintenance operations for legitimate business reasons was a pre•
rogative of management and not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Fibre•
board was nonetheless held responsible for employee losses resulting from the job
termination. See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
35. Thus it was argued in the Memorandum for the General Counsel at 2, Ex•
Cell-O Corp., Case No. 25-CA-2377 (trial examiner's decision rendered March 7, 1967),
that" an order to bargain upon request "is sufficient where an employer refused to
bargain simply to test the validity of an election proceeding [resulting in an NLRB
decision to certify] and the issue to be litigated is not patently frivolous."
However, in assessing the merits of this contention the difficulty of distinguishing
between "good faith" ;:,nd "bad faith" refusals to bargain must be taken into account.
In practice, most "bad faith" refusals are likely to be clothed in language which
asserts "good faith" doubt as to the legality of the representation proceeding. There
is presently no need to make any such distinction; the consequences of being held
in violation of section 8(a)(5) have no meaningful impact depending upon either the
"good faith" or "bad faith" of the employer. This is another area which will require
careful case-by-case development if the proposed remedy is adopted along with the
suggested distinction.
36. See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 478 (1964); Note, Labor LawThe Judicial Role in the Enforcement of the "Excelsior Rule", 66 '.'lfICH. I.. p.-t·. 1292,
1293 n.2 (1968).
-----37~-376 U.S. at--4-79.~~ -
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practice.38 Thus, the make-whole remedy imposes only an additional
risk upon an employer; he can still seek review in the same way
and the remedy will be applied only if the court of appeals rejects
the employer's affirmative defense and finds that there was an 8(a)(5)
violation. Conversely, the remedy will be unavailable to the union
if the employer is able to prove the illegality of the section 9 proceedings. The only effect that the presence of the make-whole remedy will have is that it will force the employer to assess much more
c.arefully the validity of his objections to the representation proceedings. Therefore, the contention that the make-whole remedy
amounts to a destruction of the "right" of an employer to use this
avenue of review amounts to nothing more than a plea for continuing the present impotency of the cease-and-desist order as a
Temedy for violations of section 8(a)(5). It seems clear that the pres~nt framework has encouraged frivolous attacks on the validity of
the NLRB's resolution of questions of representation under section
-;J. The congressional scheme seems clearly designed to encumber
the right of review in these situations; 39 thus, it is illogical to argue
that Congress intended to permit employers-as a matter of rightto delay collective bargaining in this manner without any fear of
the consequences of being found in violation of section 8(a)(5). The
further argument that such a "right" has become customary practice
only underscores the ineffectiveness of the existing remedy; it does
n:Jt go to the issue of the NLRB's power to utilize the more effective
make-whole remedy. 4 o
Thus far it has been assumed that if the union could establish
the propriety of the make-whole remedy, the employees would be
compensated for their losses in money damages. However, the employers may argue that this remedy conflicts with section S(d) of the
l\TLRA which prohibits the NLRB from forcing "agreement" to a
contract term upon the- employer.41 Under section 8(d), as inter38. The objective to avoid lengthy delays before certification became "final" could
not have been realized if in addition to the representation proceeding Congress int, 1ded to add an unfair labor practice proceeding, involving hearings before the
I: •~RB on the refusal-to-bargain charge, entry of an order to bargain, and litigation
hfore a court of appeals on the petition to enforce the order before cenification was
tu b,,come "effective."
:n. For an opposite conclusion, see Comment, Employee Reimbursement for an
E1,1p'oyer's Refusal To Bargain: The Ex-Cell-O Doctrine, 46 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 758, 774-75
'1(6:).

4 1• The existence of the "traditional" remedy seems to result only from the fact
, t lu: proposed remedy simply was not requested in the past; it does not seem to be
-~s1ilt of a purposeful selection of one remedy in the face of several alternatives.
r11~re novelty of the proposed remedy should not be a reason to reject it. See H. W.
·~ ;-,1, Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 714, 715 (1965), enforced as modified, NLRB v. Elson
i,,,td,ng Co., ~79 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1967).
:1 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(l964), whiclt reads in peninent pan: "[The obligation to
1, r;:a n collectivelvl does not romDt'l !'ither patty to agree to a proposal or require
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preted by the Supreme Court, "the Board may not, either directly
or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment
upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements." 42
In reliance on section 8(d), the employers make two separate
objections to the proposed remedy. The first, of course, is that
the NLRB's determination to award damages for past losses serves
to force-,-at least indirectly-a substantive contract on the employer.
However, cl closer examination of the policy underlying section S(d)
reveals that the section does not necessarily qualify a make-whole
remedy designed to dissipate the effects of the employer's past illegal
conduct. Section S(d) is designed to prevent NLRB interference
with ongoing union-employer negotiations over the contract terms
to apply to the parties in the future. 43 The give-and-take of the bargaining process, intended to be insulated from the NLRB by section
S(d),44 will not be disturbed by the proposed remedial order. This
analysis is borne out by the NLRB practice of awarding back pay
to employees who have suffered loss because of a unilateral employer
decision to subcontract work out of the bargaining unit. Such back
pay awards are determined by using the terms of an expired contract.45
An employer could, however, argue that the make-whole remedy
does interfere with the present process of bargaining. The basis of
this second argument would be that while the remedy does not
specifically mandate any contractual term, it has the practical effect
of doing so because of the expectations which it creates in the union.
I«--other words, the ·employer may legitimately argue that the union
will {;;n.'e its bargaining position when the employer finally comes
to tne table on the terms that the NLRB awards in its remedy for
the making of a concession •.• .'' See Brief for the Respondent at 11-20, Ex-Cell-O
Corp., Case No. 25-CA-2377 (trial examiner's decision rendered March 7, 1967).
42. NLRB v. American Nat!. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952). See also NLRB v.
Insurance Agents' Intl. Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487 (1960): "[I]t remains clear that
§ 8(d) was an attempt by Congress to prevent the Board from controlling the setting
of the terms of collective bargaining agreements."
43. Section 8(d) provides that "[f]or purposes of this section" collective bargaining
shall not mean the making of concessions. See note 41 supra. "This section" refers to
section 8(d), not section lO(c). Thus section 8(d) would appear to be definitional: it
relates to the meaning of "good faith bargaining," not to remedies once the question
of good faith bargaining has been answered. See United Steelworkers of America v.
NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Cf. Schlossberg & Silard, supra note 3, at
1073-77.
44. Prior to the enactment of section 8(d) in 1947, the NLRB, under the guise of
determining whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, had been exam•
ining the bargaining and judging what concessions an employer was required to make
and what proposals and counterproposals he could or could not advance. The legisla•
tive history of section 8(d) is discussed in NLRB v. American Natl. Ins, Co., 343 U.S.
395, 402-04 (1952).
45. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra; cases cited at note 23 supra.
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past misdeeds. The union may therefore come to the bargaining
table expecting no less than similar terms in the new contract.46
This theoretical possibility is analagous to the employer's argument that because the proposed remedy is imprecise, it is therefore
improper. The answer to the employer's argument should therefore
be the same in both contexts. That is, the NLRB is faced with a
policy choice between awarding no damages where there has clearly
been a violation of the NLRA by the employer or providing a remedy
which theoretically may prejudice subsequent employer interests.
As was true with the speculative remedy argument, the equities
clearly favor granting the remedy. Experience may someday show
that the remedy has such detrimental effects on future bargaining
between the parties that it is not desirable. However, until such data
is compiled, the NLRB should experiment with this proposed remedy, particularly since it is apparent that the present pattern of
remedies is incapable of dealing with these refusal-to-bargain situations. l\foreover, a recent case in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit clearly indicated that any conflict between
an order designed to remedy a section 8(a)(5) violation and the
dictates of section 8(d) is to be resolved in favor of the former section.47 That case is of vital concern because it did not involve reference to an expired contract, as in Fibreboard, but rather contained
a requirement by the NLRB that the parties include a specific term
in a contract to be negotiated in the future.
In spite of these arguments, the NLRB may feel that any potential conflict with section 8(d) would be avoided more effectively by
basing the terms of the make-whole remedy on an agreement negotiated by the parties themselves once bargaining begins. If this
method were adopted there could be no argument that the NLRB
has forced contract terms on the employer, since the terms would be
promulgated by the involved parties.48 The NLRB would not be
required to determine employee losses. To effectuate this form of
46. St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 1039,
1054 (1968).
47. United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In this
case the court conceded that the remedial order requiring an employer to accept a
dues check-off provision impinged to some extent upon the freedom of contract policy
underlying the NLRA, but found that it sufficiently furthered another basic purpose
of the statute by protecting the collective bargaining rights of employees. The court
felt that the advantages gained bv granting the remedy outweighed the disadvantage
of compelled acceptance of a pro,ision which was "at most a minor intrusion on
freedom of contract." 389 F.2d at 300-02. The applicability of the latter reasoning to
a situation where the NLRB remedy has the practical effect of setting a wage floor for
future contract negotiations is unclear. Certainly this distinction will have to be dealt
with if the proposed remedv is adopted.
48. This approach would more closely resemble the result in Fibreboard, in which
the remedy was based on a contract that the parties themselves had previously negotiated. See text accompan~ing note 21 wpra. However, this Note maintains that
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the proposed remedy, it would be sufficient to give retroactive
effect to the wage terms agreed upon after enforcement of the
NLRB's order to bargain has been secured and negotiations have
taken place. That is, new agreements would serve as the basis for
determining loss for previous employer yiolations."9
Determination of the amount of the remedy by the parties has
several distinct drawbacks, however. The first objection is that the
method does not accurately reflect the injury that the employees
have suffered, since measurement of lost benefits which should have
derived from contract terms negotiated in the past will be made in
the context of the current strength of the parties.50 The unions also
contend that if the employer is aware of the retroactive impact of
the contract once he begins bargaining, his concessions will necessarily be more narrow. Thus, they feel that the contract which would
eventually result cannot be as favor-able as one ,vhich is free from
the shadow of retroactivity. However, it-can also -be maiatained that
this latter claim does-not really distinguish the "retroactive contract"
method of determining the amount of lost benefits from the proposed Ex-Cell-O remedy. An employer who is directly ordered by
the NLRB to pay a predetermined amount of damages will be quite
likely to refle-ct that economic burden in future bargaining intransigence.
Perhaps the most serious objection to the use of the retroactive
contract principle is that it is possible that many contract agreements
would never be reached if it were applied. The effect of the remedy
would JJe tantamount to requiring the parties to negotiate a double
c-&a.tract. One would expect pressures at the bargaining table to
mo1mt because of the magnification of the stakes; it is likely that
the parties would be unable to reach an agreement. The creation
of such an impediment to agreement hardly seems to further the
NLRA's objective of promoting industrial peace "by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." 51
Weaker unions would almost certainly find the retroactive contract remedy to be as ineffective as the present cease-and-desist-order
remedy. Ultimately, one can question the fairness of any doctrine
section 8(d) does not prohibit the proposed remedy, see text accompanying notes 40-45
supra.
49. See Retail Wholesale, & Dept. Store Union v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 301, 307-08 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
50. Arguably union strength is less at the time of the remedy than it was at the
date of the employer's initial refusal to bargain, -:ree text accompanying notes 14-17
supra. However, it may be that this method, in certain circumstances, will produce
results at least as accurate as those that would be derived from an NLRB determination of employee losses based on statistical data, see text accompanying notes 28-31
supra. This would seem to be the case especially where the union is strong; the
remedy has been requested by unions in the past, see, e.g., Retail Union v. NLRB, SB5
F.2d 301, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
51. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
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which forces the injured party's representative to obtain relief by
going to the ·wrongdoer and bargaining with him over the terms of
reimbursement for the loss suffered. The possibility of adequate
compensation for loss suffered from the illegal refusal to bargain
would be enhanced if unions could begin the bargaining talks with
the amount of the award for the employer's earlier unlawful act
already determined.
It is therefore submitted that the preferable method of effectuating the make-whole remedy is that actually proposed by the interested unions-direct NLRB determination of the loss suffered by
employees.152 Separating this remedy from the negotiations about
future contract terms will eliminate a touchy issue from a confrontation that is not likely to be smooth under any circumstances.53
The complexities which the proposed remedy portend for the
system of review of NLRB certification decisions must not be overlooked. A "technical" section 8(a)(5) violation brings into play a
lengthy process requiring an NLRB determination on the merits,
entry of an order to bargain, and enforcement of that order at the
court of appeals level if the employer is found to have committed
an unlawful refusal to bargain. The proposed remedy will add to
this already cumbersome process a supplemental NLRB hearing to
establish employee loss. Enforcement of the resulting compensatory
order will almost certainly require additional litigation in the court
of appeals. It may be that Congress would prefer a system of direct
review of representation proceedings to this time-consuming procedure. Such review would eliminate the need for "technical" 8(a)(5)
violations. The earlier defeats of such proposals may have been due
to the failure of Congress to comprehend all of the implications of
a system of compensating employees for benefits lost because of
52. This is not to say that the NLRB should never use the retroactive contract
approach. It has been stated. that strong unions might find the remedy effective in
certain circumstances, see Retail, ,vholesale, &: Dept. Store Union v. NLRB, 385 F.2d
:JOI (D.C. Cir. 1967). It should be o~n to the NLRB to determine in each case the
method which it feels will most accurately measure the loss. This concept of allowing
the NLRB to use the remedy it deems the best is consistent with the principle that once
the fact of loss is established, it is crucial to find the method which would most acmratcly determine the amount lost. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
53. A large compensatory award given at the critical time when contract negotiations are to begin would in effect force an employer to finance the union's "strike
fund." A lump-sum payment at such a time would conceivably put the union in a
position of much greater economic strength than it was in immediately after certification when bargaining should have begun. If this award led unions to resort more readily
to the strike weapon to achieve success in the first contract negotiations, then it
might have implications which are inconsistent with the purposes of the NLRA, as
stated in section 1 (see text accompanying note 51 supra). In order to avoid these
difficulties, the NLRB might withhold any compensatory order until contract negotiations between the parties had concluded. Furthermore, payment of compensation
might be made over a period of months or years rather than in a lump sum. Spreading
out pa}'IIlents could at the same time help alleviate the economic burden of the
award.

392

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67

8(a)(5) violations.114 On the other hand, Congress may still wish to
minimize litigation of representation issues; such litigation would
probably follow every NLRB certification decision if there was a
system of direct review,li5 The remedy proposed by the union in
Ex-Cell-0-while creating a process of compensation that would be
long and involved_;_has the advantage that it would probably limit
such litigation to cases in which employers entertain genuine doubts
about the NLRB's conduct of the representation proceedings. There
would also -be no problem of delay in such cases since an employer
who knows that he is liable for losses stemming from his refusal to
bclrgain will seek to resolve the dispute as quickly as possible.116 It
has also been suggested that the Board make liberal use of the 100)111
injunction provision of the NLRA.58 In cases involving "bad-faith"
54. See text accompanying notes 50 &: 51 supra.
55. See S. REP. No 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935); H.R. REP. No. II47, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935); 93 CONG. REc. 6444 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft). Fears
that such litigation would become automatic appear to be justified. In Leedom v. Kyne,
358 U.S. 184 (1958), 2n exception was fashioned to the policy that NLRB decisions
arising out of certification proceedings were reviewable only as an incident to review
of unfair labor practice cases. The Supreme Court held that a district court had
original jurisdiction to strike down an NLRB certification order when it was made
"in excess of [the NLRB's] powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act,"
358 U.S. at 188. Before Boire v. Greyhound, 376 U.S. 473 (1964), made clear that the
Leedom v. Kyne rule was limited to instances where the NLRB flouts an express
statutory command, 376 U.S. at 479, the Leedom v. Kyne "exception" threatened to
swallow up the original policy. More than fifty cases in which employers sought to
enjoin representation elections were pending in the lower federal courts at the time
that Boire v. Greyhound reached the Supreme Court. See 56 Lab. Rel. Rep. Analysis
35-36 (June 29, 1964). See also Koretz, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court:
1963 Term, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1964); Note, Labor Law-Judicia1 'ReviewDistrict Court Has No Jurisdiction To Review Certification Proceedin;;:; 'Where Question Is Essentially One of Fact, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 251 (1964).
56. A good example of the tactics presently resorted to by emplt>yers to delay
litigation is contained in the trial examiner's decision in Ex-Cell-O, TXD-80-67, at
3-7 (March 7, 1967). Union-caused delay in the proceedings would not seem to be a
problem since the primary union objective following certification is to obtain recognition ana begin bargaining. But if prompt court review of representation issues is
desired, it may be better to have Congress formulate a system of direct re,iew, see
text accompanying note 54 supra.
57. NLRA § IO(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(i) (1964), which reads in pertinent part:
TheJ3oard shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint ... charging that
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition
any United States district co\Jrt, within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in questioli. is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or
transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the
filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon
such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such
temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.
58. See Note, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section IO(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, II2 U. PENN. L. REv. 69, 86 (1963). In Madden v. Alberto Culver
Co., 49 L.R.R.M. 2516 (N.D. Ill. 1961), a temporary injunction under section IO(j) was
granted. It ordered the employer to meet at reasonable times for the purpose of
collective bargaining; to accord recognition to the- union; to negotiate on any matter
relating to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or any other term or condition
of employment; to demand no unreasonable concessions or impose no unilateral
changes in any term of condition of employment, or by any other means fail or refuse
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refusals to bargain this might be a solution to the problem of delay
in obtaining recognition of the union. But until Congress decides
that a re-examination of the remedial provisions of the NLRA is
neededY 9 the Ex-Cell-O proposal would seem to accord favorably
with the mandate of section 10(c), which calls for dissipation of the
effects of unfair labor practices.

to bargain in good faith; and to sign a written agreement if an understanding wa;

reached.
See also the recommendation that the NLRB use the 10G) provision in cases of
section 8(a)(3) violations in Prepared Statement of Mr. Leslie Aspin, Summary of
Findings of a Study of Reinstatement Under the National Labor Relations Act, Hearings on H.R. 11725 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. or
Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1967); Note, A Survey of Labor Remedies
54 VA. L. REv. 8, 51-52 (1968); Comment, supra note 39, at 783 n.122. But another
writer finds serious deficiencies in the suggestion to use section 10(j). Ross, supra note
13, at 319.
59. The House Committee on Education and Labor held hearings in 1967 on H.R.
11725, a bill designed to increae the effectiveness of the customary "reinstatement with
back pay" order given by the NLRB for section 8(a)(3) violations. See Hearings, supra
note 58. The bill contains no specific changes in the general remedial power of the
NLRB under section 10(c), and would thus appear to have no effect on section 8(a)(5)
remedies. However, the length of the hearings on the bill-they took up eight days
in the month of August-would suggest that Congress may be receptive to other
proposals intended to increase the effectiveness of the remedies for violations of the
NLRA. Rectifying the consequences of an 8(a)(5) violation in the first bargaining
contract situation may be considered a pressing subject for legislative attention if
the NLRB finds the Ex-Cell-O proposal unworkable for any reason.

